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ABSTRACT
This article investigates, in the Brazilian capital market, the effect of the composition of the board of directors on executive 
compensation sensitivity to market performance, known as pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Due to potential agency conflicts 
between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and managers, members of the board of directors 
of the executive board or those appointed by the controlling shareholder might have less independence, something which 
may compromise monitoring effectiveness and, consequently, reduce the PPS. The purpose is contributing to understand 
the agency conflicts that have taken place in the Brazilian capital market and to define the configuration of the monitoring 
and compensation mechanisms that minimize total agency costs, maximizing shareholders’ wealth. The research results 
have implications for understanding the agency relations and for corporate governance in the Brazilian capital market. It 
is concluded that the relation between the monitoring exercised by the board of directors and executive compensation is a 
condition for its effectiveness as a governance mechanism in the Brazilian capital market. Data within the period 2013-2015 
from 92 companies that participate in the Brazil 100 Index (IBRX 100) of the São Paulo Stock, Mercantile & Futures Exchange 
(BM&FBOVESPA) were analyzed. In addition to tests of difference between mean values and correlation, estimates were 
processed through feasible generalized least squares modeling. The independence of the board of directors vis-à-vis the 
controlling shareholder and the executive board may work as a corporate governance mechanism supplementing executive 
compensation. The results of this study indicate that the proportion of executives and independent members in the board of 
directors reduces the PPS, a measurement for executive compensation effectiveness made operational by the contemporary 
relation between increased managers’ compensation and increased company’s market value. 
Keywords: agency conflicts, corporate governance, board of directors, executive compensation, pay-performance sensitivity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation is pointed out as one of the 
agency costs incurred by shareholders, as a result of 
conflicts between their interests and managers’ interests 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
This cost may be an instrument to align interests, by 
encouraging managers to make decisions that maximize 
return for shareholders (Correia, Amaral & Louvet, 2014; 
Murphy, 1998). In this context, the optimal executive 
compensation contract might be the one that maximizes 
compensation sensitivity to corporate performance 
(Murphy, 1998). The financial literature addresses such 
sensitivity, in general, as the relation between increased 
managers’ compensation and increased company’s market 
value, termed as pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1998; Víctor, 2013). However, if 
there are no control mechanisms over managers’ actions, 
they can earn a value higher than the return provided 
by their actions to the shareholders, reducing the PPS 
(Hassen, Ouakdi & Omri, 2015).
In Brazil, the administrators’ compensation, including 
members of the board of directors and executive board, 
is fixed by the shareholders’ general meeting, according 
to Law No. 6,404 (1976), enacted on December 15, 1976, 
the Brazilian Corporation Law. According to the Brazilian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC, 2015), the 
board of directors is the body responsible for defining 
executive compensation policy, while the general meeting 
must approve it. In this context, a rather active and 
independent board of directors might seek the optimal 
executive compensation contract that can make it possible 
to maximize the PPS (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; 
Víctor, 2013).
This issue led to the following question: 
What is the effect of the composition of the board of 
directors on executive compensation sensitivity to corporate 
performance? 
This research aimed to investigate the effect of the 
composition of the board of directors on the executive 
board compensation sensitivity to performance in 
Brazilian companies.
In countries with an Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance model (Rossetti & Andrade, 2012), 
research was conducted on the correlation between 
the composition of the board of directors and the 
effectiveness of executive compensation (Chhaochharia 
& Grinstein, 2009; Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999; 
Lippert & Moore, 1994; Lippert & Porter, 1997). In 
these countries, most companies have a dispersed 
ownership structure, characterizing the agency conflict 
between shareholders and managers and there is greater 
effectiveness of external control mechanisms (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998).
In the Brazilian market, characterized by companies 
with high ownership concentration, poor enforcement, 
and weak legal protection of minority shareholders (La 
Porta et al., 1998), there has been an effort to improve 
corporate governance standards, with actions such as 
differential listing segments on the São Paulo Stock, 
Mercantile & Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) 
and stimulating the purchase of shares by institutional 
investors (Black, Carvalho & Sampaio, 2014; Blume & 
Alonso, 2007), making the capital market stronger. These 
characteristics highlight the importance of investigating 
this correlation in Brazilian companies. The predominant 
agency conflict in Brazil lies on the relation between 
controlling shareholder, who has excess power over 
management, and minority shareholders (Brandão & 
Crisóstomo, 2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013), something 
which may reduce the independence of the board of 
directors. The lower pressure from the capital market 
and the legal system for optimization of corporate 
governance systems in the Brazilian capital market 
raises the importance of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013), such as the 
board of directors.
Due to potential agency conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders and between shareholders 
and managers, members of the board of directors 
who are members of the executive board or those 
appointed by the controlling shareholder would have 
less independence, something which may compromise 
monitoring effectiveness and, consequently, reduce the 
PPS. Therefore, the study, tests the hypothesis that “the 
composition of the board of directors affects executive 
compensation sensitivity to corporate performance.”
With this research, it is hoped to further base corporate 
governance as a field of study in Brazil, by analyzing the 
correlation between monitoring mechanisms (composition 
of the board of directors) and managers’ compensation 
(executive compensation) and the effectiveness of this 
correlation in maximizing return for shareholders 
(compensation sensitivity to performance). Thus, the 
aim is contributing to understand the agency conflicts 
that have taken place in the Brazilian capital market 
and to define the configuration of the monitoring and 
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compensation mechanisms that minimize total agency 
costs, maximizing return for shareholders.
Data within the period from 2013 to 2015 belonging 
to 92 companies that participate in the Brazil 100 Index 
(IBRX 100) of the BM&FBOVESPA were analyzed. 
Corporate performance was measured in terms of annual 
variation in the market value. Executive compensation 
was measured by the increase in total annual and 
per capita annual pay. In the board of directors, the 
following items were identified: the proportion of 
effective members participating in the executive 
board, the proportion of effective members appointed 
by minority shareholders, the proportion of effective 
members declared independent, and the existing overlap 
between the functions chief executive officer (CEO) 
and chairman of the board of directors. The effect of 
the composition of the board of directors on executive 
compensation sensitivity was analyzed by means of 
difference test between mean values, correlation analysis, 
and regression analysis.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Agency Conflicts and Executive 
Compensation
The agency theory analyzes conflicts of interest between 
shareholders (principal)  and managers (agent) with a focus 
on the separation of ownership and management (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). These conflicts generate agency costs 
that might reduce the principal’s well-being: monitoring 
expenses and managerial incentives by the principal; 
expenses with the granting of contractual guarantees by 
the agent; and residual costs resulting from managers’ 
actions that do not maximize the principal’s well-being.
Among the amounts spent by the principal, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) include applying appropriate 
incentives to the agent. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 
that long-term contractual incentives for managers are 
the best solution to align their interests with shareholders’ 
interests. Overt incentives for the alignment of interests 
between managers and shareholders concern managers’ 
compensation (Tirole, 2006).
According to Murphy (1998), compensation plans are 
designed to align risk aversion interests and executives’ 
interests with shareholders’ interests. According to the 
theory of the optimal compensation contract (Hart & 
Holmstrom, 1986), the best executive compensation 
configuration is the one maximizing the neutral risk of 
the shareholder’s purpose measured by the difference 
between corporate performance and cost of managers’ 
compensation. Based on the information principle 
(Holmstrom, 1979), the best measurement for manager 
performance in terms of maximizing shareholder’s well-
being is based on stock prices.
Thus, the compensation policy effectiveness has been 
investigated through executive compensation sensitivity to 
corporate performance, known as PPS (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990). The model proposed by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), more commonly used in empirical research 
(Murphy, 1998; Víctor, 2013), investigates the increase 
of each monetary unit in executive compensation for 
each thousand monetary units in the market value. Some 
studies use other measurements for market performance 
or book return and total or per capita pay for executive 
compensation (Murphy, 1998; Víctor, 2013). In Brazil, 
empirical evidence shows inconsistent results about 
the correlation between executive compensation and 
corporate performance (Correia et al., 2014; Fernandes & 
Mazzioni, 2015; Krauter, 2013; Sonza & Kloeckner, 2014).
2.2 Board of Directors and Pay-Performance 
Sensitivity 
In order to make the compensation policy capable to 
align managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests, other 
internal governance mechanisms are needed (Correia et 
al., 2014). In firms with a weaker governance structure, 
more agency problems occur and managers have more 
discretionary power to influence their own compensation 
(Kerr & Kren, 1992).
The Brazilian legislation assigns to the general meeting 
of shareholders the role of determining the remuneration 
of board of directors and executive board. According to 
the IBGC (2015), the board of directors must define the 
compensation policy and incentives for the executive 
board as a whole, as well as evaluate its performance. Good 
corporate governance practices for Brazilian companies 
even highlight the importance of having an advisory 
committee for the board of directors, preferably consisting 
of independent directors, responsible for appointing 
executives and defining the executives’ compensation 
policy (IBGC, 2015). When exercising this function, 
executives may use their bargaining power along with 
members of the board of directors to maximize its 
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usefulness, leading to a compensation policy that does 
not maximize value for external shareholders (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2003; Core et al., 1999). More recently, the 
research by Aguiar and Pimentel (2017) found evidence 
of a bidirectional relation between executive compensation 
and financial and market performance, but it did not 
analyze the effect of the composition of the board of 
directors on this relation.
O’Reilly and Main (2007) see strong indications that 
the greater the number of board members appointed 
by the CEO, the lesser the compensation contract 
resembles something negotiated on a fairly basis. Bruce 
and Skovoroda (2015) believe that the executives’ ability 
to influence their compensation is greater when the board 
of directors is weak and executives are strong. According 
to these authors, the separation between the role of CEO 
and the chairman of the board of directors, the greater 
proportion of non-executive members in this board, and 
the effectiveness and independence of the nominating and 
compensation committees are associated with a rather 
robust compensation process.
The literature on the effect of the board of directors’ 
composition on the PPS is still incipient in Brazil. One 
of the few studies found (Víctor, 2013) investigated this 
correlation in the context of company obligation to disclose 
information about its executives’ compensation. The 
author used the number of external members appointed 
by the controlling shareholder as a characteristic of the 
board of directors and the change in the natural logarithm 
of the average compensation of the board of directors and 
of the executive board as a variable indicating managers’ 
compensation. The research sample was composed by 
Brazilian companies and a control group consisting of 
U.S. companies. The findings indicated that, when a 
distinction is made between Brazilian and U.S. companies 
(by means of a dummy variable), a higher percentage of 
external members reduces the PPS in Brazilian companies. 
However, when no distinction was made, no effect was 
observed for the composition of the board of directors 
on the PPS.
2.3 Development of Specific Hypotheses and 
the Theoretical Model
Considering the purpose of this study, four hypotheses 
were formulated regarding the composition of the board 
of directors that can influence the increase or decrease in 
agency conflicts and interfere with the PPS.
The power and locus of control of the company CEO 
increase by accumulating the position of chairman of the 
board of directors, whereas an independent chairman 
makes it easier to evaluate the executive board on an 
objective basis (Boyd, 1994). Therefore, it is expected that 
accumulating of the position of company CEO with that 
of chairman of the board of directors, known as the CEO 
duality, reduces the compensation policy effectiveness due 
to the CEO’s attempt to reduce its risk (Krause, Semadeni 
& Cannella, 2014), something which might lead to reduce 
the PPS. It is worth noticing that some studies conducted 
in the U.S. and British markets did not find empirical 
evidence of this correlation (Conyon, 1997; Lippert & 
Porter, 1997).
H1: the CEO duality reduces the executive compensation 
sensitivity to performance.
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that non-executive 
members of board of directors are more active in 
monitoring than insiders. The presence of company 
executives in the board of directors may help raise their 
power of influence on this board, making it more difficult 
for executives to move out in case of underperformance 
(Sonza & Kloeckner, 2014). Likewise, a larger number of 
executives in its board of directors can reduce the PPS 
(Lippert & Porter, 1997).
H2: the greater proportion of executives in the board of 
directors reduces the executive compensation sensitivity to 
performance.
Unlike what takes place in the Anglo-Saxon 
environment, where the main agency conflict lies on the 
relation between shareholders and managers, companies 
with a controlling shareholder predominate in Brazil, 
something which gives rise to another agency conflict, 
derived from the relation between the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders, termed as 
principal-principal agency conflict (Brandão & Crisóstomo, 
2015; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). In this context, the 
board of directors mostly consists of members appointed 
by the controlling shareholder, and this also influences 
the nomination of managers (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton & Jiang, 2008). This overlap between controlling 
shareholder and management may generate, as private 
benefits of control, earnings that do not correspond to 
managers’ actions. For a more effective performance of the 
board of directors in this context, the presence of members 
representing the position of minority shareholders in this 
collegiate is key.
H3: the greater proportion of members of the board of directors 
not appointed by the controlling shareholder increases the 
executive compensation sensitivity to performance.
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In addition to the external members and those not 
indicated by the controlling shareholder, there are, in the 
board of directors, independent members who, according 
to the Brazilian legislation, should not have any relation 
to shareholders or managers, and this may mitigate 
both conflicts between shareholders and managers and 
those between the controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders. A board of directors with greater proportion 
of independent members (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 
2009; Core et al., 1999) and advised by an independent 
compensation committee (Guthrie, Sokolowsky & Wan, 
2012) may reduce executive power, by increasing the PPS 
(Ozerturk, 2005).
H4: the greater proportion of independent members in the 
board of directors increases the executive compensation 
sensitivity to performance.
Figure 1 represents the study’s theoretical model, 
which synthesizes the relations expected having the four 
hypotheses formulated as a basis. 
Figure 1 Research’s theoretical model
Source:  Prepared by the authors.
The hypotheses  H1 and H2 refer to conflicts between 
shareholders and managers arising from the presence 
of executives in the board of directors, which increases 
the risk of expropriation by managers (agent-principal 
conflict): overlap between the positions of company CEO 
and chairman of the board of directors (CEO duality) 
and company executives in the board of directors. The 
hypothesis H3 addresses the participation of members of 
the board of directors not indicated by the controlling 
shareholder, which might reduce conflicts between the 
latter and minority shareholders (principal-principal 
conflict). The hypothesis H4 addresses the presence of 
independent members in the board of directors, something 
which might reduce agency conflicts, both from the agent-
principal perspective and from the principal-principal 
perspective. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample and Data Source
The research population includes the 100 
companies whose stocks constitute the IBRX 100 of the 
BM&FBOVESPA, theoretical portfolio of assets with the 
highest tradability and representativeness in the Brazilian 
stock market. The choice of this group was mainly due 
to the need to use, as a measurement for performance, 
company’s market value via stock prices, which requires 
minimum criteria for tradability. Also, the IBRX 100 
companies are those most representative of the Brazilian 
capital market. We chose to analyze data from the last 
three fiscal years available at the date of survey (2013, 
2014, and 2015).
Data were collected from companies whose stocks 
comprised the theoretical portfolio of the IBRX 100 
within the period from September to December 2016, 
totaling 97 companies (3 companies had 2 stocks in 
the IBRX 100). With the exclusion of 5 companies that 
did not have all data required by the survey, the sample 
consisted of an unbalanced panel with 92 companies and 
272 observations.
Data on the composition of the board of directors were 
extracted from the company’s Reference Forms, available 
on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM). Executive compensation data were 
extracted from the Brazilian Corporate Information 
System (SInC) and financial data were collected from 
the Economatica® database.
3.2 Empirical Model
The empirical model on which this study was based is 
the PPS model as proposed by Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
which regressed the increase in each monetary unit in 
the CEO compensation to the increase in every 1,000 
monetary units in the market value of U.S. companies. The 
choice of market value as a performance variable is related 
to the information principle (Holmstrom, 1979), according 
to which the best measurement for manager performance 
in terms of maximizing shareholder’s well-being is based 
on stock prices. The use of compensation and market value 
variation instead of global values  contributes to mitigate 
endogeneity problems due to explanatory variables 
omitted (Hallock, Madalozzo & Reck, 2010).
The empirical model of this research adds, to the model 
proposed by Jensen and Murphy (1990), the variables 
indicating the composition of the board of directors 
and an interactive variable of market value variation 
(in thousands of reais) with the variables indicating the 
composition of the board of directors, as well as a set of 
control variables, as observed in equation 1.
where ∆COMi,t is executive board compensation variation 
of company i in period t in relation to period t-1, ∆MVi,t is 
the variation, in thousands of reais, of the market value of 
company i in period t in relation to period t-1, COMPBDi,t 
represents the variables indicating the composition of the 
board of directors of company i in period t, ∑CONTit is the vector of control variables included in the model, β1, 
β2 and β3 and β4 are the angular coefficients of explanatory 
variables, and ε is the error term in the equation.
It is worth highlighting the value and statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the interaction variable 
(β3), which measures the moderating effect of the 
composition variables of the board of directors on the 
PPS, as indicated by Hair, Anderson, Tathan and Black 
(2005). If β3 is statistically different from 0, the hypothesis 
that the composition of the board of directors affects 
compensation sensitivity to performance (β1) is accepted.
3.3 Measurement of Variables
Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of the study 
variables. The variable executive board compensation 
(∆COM), unlike what Jensen and Muphy (1990) propose, 
was operationalized in terms of the total compensation 
of the executive board, considering the sum of the 
executives’ compensation (∆TCOM) and the per capita 
pay (∆PCCOM) weighted by company’s market value 
in t-1. In the original model, CEO compensation was 
used. Market value variation (∆MV) has been made 
operational in a similar way to what was proposed by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), considering the total variation 
in company’s market value in thousands of reais, also 
weighted by market value in t-1. Weighting was due to 
the high amplitude of original data.
1∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�,� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽�∆𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀�,� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�,� + 𝛽𝛽�∆𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀�,� ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�,� + 𝛽𝛽��𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
�,�
+ 𝜀𝜀 
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Table 1 
Variables used in the study
Construct Variable Operationalization Data source References
Executive board 
compensation 
variation 
(∆COM)
Total compensation 
variation (∆TCOM)
Difference between total executive 
board compensation in t and t-1 (in 
R$ units) weighted by market value in 
t-1 (in thousand R$)
Reference Form,
item 13.2, SInc
Jensen and Murphy (1990)
Víctor (2013)
Per capita pay variation 
(∆PCCOM)
Difference between per capita 
executive board compensation in t 
and compensation in t-1 (in R$ units) 
weighted by market value in t-1 (in 
thousand R$)
Reference Form,
item 13.2, via SInC
Jensen and Murphy (1990)
Víctor (2013)
Performance 
(∆MV)
Market value variation 
(∆MV)
Difference between company’s market 
value in t and value in t-1 (in thousand 
R$) weighted by market value in t-1 (in 
thousand R$)
Economatica® Jensen and Murphy (1990)
Composition
of the BoD
(COMPBD)
CEO duality (DUALBD)
Accumulation of positions of CEO and 
chairman of the BoD (dummy variable)
Reference Form,
item 12.6/8
Conyon, (1997)
Lippert and Porter (1997)
Members of the BoD 
participating in the 
executive board (INTBD)
Proportion of effective members of 
the BoD that hold an executive board 
position
Reference Form,
item 12.6/8
Lippert and Porter (1997)
Minority members of the 
BoD (MINBD)
Proportion of effective members of the 
BoD not indicated by the controlling 
shareholder
Reference Form,
item 12.6/8
Víctor (2013)
Independente members of 
the BoD (INDBD)
Proportion of members of the BoD 
regarded as independent
Reference Form,
item 12.6/8
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2009)
Control
variables
(CONT)
Compensation committee 
(COMPCOM)
Presence of a compensation committee 
in the BoD (dummy variable)
Reference Form,
item 12.1
Guthrie et al. (2012)
Return on equity (ROE)
Ratio between company’s net income 
in t and the company’s equity in t-1
Economatica® Aguiar and Pimentel (2017)
Size 
(SIZE)
Natural logarithm of total company 
assets in t-1
Economatica® Aguiar and Pimentel (2017)
Concentration of voting 
rights (OWNER)
Percentage of ordinary shares held 
by the company’s three biggest 
shareholders in t
Economatica® Correia et al. (2014)
Activity sector (SECTOR)
Company’s activity sector according to 
the Economatica® (dummy variable)
Economatica® Aguiar and Pimentel (2017)
Time period (YEAR) Year of observation (dummy variable) - -
BoD = Board of Directors; CEO = chief executive officer.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The composition of the board of directors (COMPBD) 
has been made operational in four proxies, one for 
each specific hypothesis, considering only the effective 
members of the board of directors: CEO duality 
(DUALBD); proportion of effective members of the 
board of directors who hold an executive board position 
(INTBD); proportion of effective members of the board 
of directors not indicated by the controlling shareholder 
(MINBD); and proportion of members of the board of 
directors regarded as independent (INDBD).
Control variables included as potential determinants of 
executive compensation: the existence of a compensation 
committee linked to the board of directors (COMPCOM), 
responsible for supervising the conception and 
implementation of the executive annual incentive plan 
(Machado & Beuren, 2015); return on equity (ROE) as 
a proxy for financial performance (Aguiar & Pimentel, 
2017); size of the company (SIZE) approximated by the 
natural logarithm of the total assets (Aguiar & Pimentel, 
2017); concentration of voting rights in the three biggest 
shareholders (OWNER) (Correia et al., 2014); activity 
sector (SECTOR) (Aguiar & Pimentel, 2017); and year 
of observation (YEAR).
3.4 Statistical Procedures
The hypotheses were tested using means difference 
tests and estimates processed through equation 1. The 
mean difference tests are aimed at comparing companies 
whose board of directors has, among its effective members, 
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those not indicated by controlling shareholders (minority), 
those participating in the executive board (internal), and 
those declared independent, as well as the accumulation of 
positions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors 
(CEO duality). As for these four characteristics, all the 
metric variables (∆TCOM, ∆PCP, ∆MV, SIZE, ROE, and 
OWNER) were compared. The Mann Whitney U test was 
used, given the non-normality of variables.
In the estimates, the dependent variables were total 
compensation variation (∆TCOM) and per capita pay 
variation (∆PCCOM). For each of the variables, an estimate 
was processed, using each of the four variables indicating 
the composition of the board of directors (DUALBD, 
INTBD, MINBD, and INDBD). In all estimations, feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) modeling was used to 
mitigate heteroscedasticity problems and autocorrelation 
of residues observed in regression analysis with panel 
data (Wooldridge, 2002).
The normality of residues was verified by means of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and collinearity between 
the independent variables was verified through the FIV 
statistics. Both tests in the estimates processed have shown 
that the assumptions were not violated.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the composition of the board of directors. The first part identifies the 
composition in absolute numbers and the second indicates the composition relativized by the total number of members.
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the composition of the board of directors
Variable Minimum Maximum Average Standard deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
Number of 
members
Total 4.00 17.00 8.60 2.01 0.23
Minority 0.00 11.00 2.50 2.93 1.17
Internal 0.00 6.00 0.68 0.84 1.23
Independent 0.00 8.00 2.35 1.66 0.71
Proportion
Minority (MINBD) 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.34 1.16
Internal (INTBD) 0.00 0.55 0.08 0.10 1.20
Independent 
(INDBD)
0.00 1.00 0.28 0.21 0.73
Notes: the variables are described in Table 1; number of companies: 92; number of observations: 272; period under analysis: 
2013 to 2015.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The board of directors has an average of eight to nine 
members, with low variability of data. This figure is in 
accordance with the recommendations of the IBGC 
(2015), which suggests between five and 11 effective 
members. This is close to the findings reported by Cunha 
and Martins (2015), who investigated the companies in the 
IBRX 100 within the period from 2008 to 2012, finding 
the average composition of 8.54 members.
Regarding the composition, it is observed that 
29% of the members of the board of directors are 
not appointed by the controlling shareholder, 8% are 
company executives and 28% are declared independent. 
An unreported temporal analysis indicates that the size 
and composition of the board of directors remain stable, 
with no statistically significant differences in the three 
years analyzed. Comparing studies conducted in previous 
periods, Brandão and Crisóstomo (2015) verified that 27% 
of the members were indicated by minority shareholders, 
12% were internal, and 20% were independent, in the 
100 biggest companies between 2010 and 2013. Cunha 
and Martins (2015) identified that 22.5% of the members 
were appointed by minority shareholders and 30.5% were 
independent. In general, it is noticed that the composition 
of the board of directors regarding the proportion of 
internal, minority, and independent members has not 
undergone major changes in recent years.
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As for the CEO duality, this characteristic is present in 
only 16 observations, about 6% of the sample. This index 
is lower than the 15% found by Brandão and Crisóstomo 
(2015) and the 25% identified by Andrade, Salazar, 
Calegario and Silva (2009) when studying the period from 
2004 to 2006. In this study, by comparing the three years 
surveyed, the number of companies with CEO duality 
fell year after year: eight in 2013, five in 2014, and three 
in 2015. These figures and the comparison to previous 
surveys show that the practice has been discontinued 
in companies in the Brazilian capital market. Another 
characteristic of the board of directors analyzed (control 
variable) was the presence of a compensation committee. 
Out of the 272 observations, this committee is present in 
139, about 51% of the sample.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of executive 
compensation and market value at their original values  (R$ 
units for compensation and thousand R$  for market value).
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of executive compensation and market value in gross values
Variables Minimum Maximum Average Standard deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
Total compensation
In the period 69,000 453,527,265 29,990,392 56,413,309 1.88
Annual variation -46,215,088 89,552,431 2,644,262 11,033,969 4.17
Per capita 
remuneration
In the period 19,220 15,261,692 3,397,387 2,570,666 0.76
Annual variation -5,577,924 6,895,910 343,161 1,396,859 4.07
Market value
In the period 386,079 279,978,928 20,680,448 40,274,047 1.95
Annual variation -87,182,129 32,440,328 -1,515,975 10,218,206 -6.74
Notes: total compensation and per capita pay in R$ units; market value in thousand R$; number of companies: 92; number of 
observations: 272; period under analysis: 2013 to 2015.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
The average annual pay of the executive board in 
the sample companies reaches about R$ 30 million, 
while the average annual per capita pay reaches R$ 3.4 
million. Another point to notice is the average increase 
in annual pay, which also leads to inflation in the values 
within the period under analysis compared to the survey 
conducted by the IBGC. The executive compensation 
variation in the sample is low, while the annual variation 
is high, with a coefficient higher than 4. The average 
market value of the companies under analysis amounts 
to about R$ 20.7 million and there was a significant 
loss of value within the period analyzed (coefficient of 
variation -6.74).
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of financial 
variables and ownership structure in the way they were 
used in statistical analysis.
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of the metric variables used in statistical analysis
Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
∆TCOM -6.806 6.502 0.259 0.115 1.111 4.285
∆PCCOM -1.710 1.150 0.036 0.015 0.239 6.624
∆MV -0.817 1.385 -0.044 -0.059 0.317 -7.168
SIZE 20.504 27.994 23.300 23.159 1.533 0.066
ROE -1.914 8.605 0.173 0.134 0.605 3.503
OWNER 0.069 1.000 0.599 0.630 0.235 0.393
Notes: the variables are described in Table 1; unbalanced panel of 92 companies; number of observations: 272; period under 
analysis: 2013 to 2015.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
As shown in Table 3, while executive compensation 
increased year-over-year within the period under 
analysis, the market value of companies under analysis 
has decreased. The financial performance measured by the 
ROE was positive on average, but it showed great dispersion 
in the sample. The concentration of voting rights is high 
and, like size, it shows low variation in the sample.
4.2 Composition of the Board of Directors and 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity
In Table 5, the metric variables are compared to the 
categories of directors analyzed in the survey: minority, 
internal, independent, and CEO, occupying the position 
of chairman of the board of directors. The presence 
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of these categories of board of directors’ members 
(directors) was not associated with the executive 
compensation variation and the performance measured 
by the ROE.
Table 5 
Composition of the board of directors and metric variables
Board of directors n ∆TCOM ∆PCCOM ∆MV SIZE ROE OWNER
Without minority members 89 0.285 0.048 -0.069 23.415 0.231 0.665
With minority members 183 0.246 0.030 -0.032 23.244 0.144 0.566
Mann Whitney’s U (Z test) -0.170 -0.707 -0.550 -0.803 -0.688 -3.268***
Without internal members 136 0.285 0.026 -0.005 23.010 0.215 0.590
With internal members 136 0.246 0.046 -0.084 23.590 0.131 0.608
Mann Whitney’s U (Z test) -0.980 -0.658 -1.696* -2.095** -0.378 -0.544
Without independent members 50 0.418 0.065 -0.067 24.368 0.128 0.747
With independent members 222 0.223 0.009 -0.039 23.060 0.183 0.565
Mann Whitney’s U (Z test) -0.800 -0.501 -0.619 -5.329*** -2.143 -4.973***
Without CEO duality 256 0.231 0.031 -0.035 23.275 0.179 0.601
With CEO duality 16 0.712 0.119 -0.186 23.699 0.074 0.555
Mann Whitney’s U (Z test) -0.419 -0.835 -1.916* -1.114 -1.572 -1.063
Notes: unbalanced panel of 92 companies; number of observations: 272; period under analysis: 2013 to 2015; Mann Whitney U 
tests for independent samples.
CEO = chief executive officer.
*, **, *** = statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Directors not indicated by the controlling shareholder 
are present in 67% of the observations and they are 
associated with lower concentration of voting rights. 
Controlling shareholders, when they have greater voting 
power, indicate all members of the board of directors, 
something which can maximize agency problems with 
minority shareholders.
Half of the companies have executives present in the 
board of directors and, in 6%, the CEO accumulates the 
position of chairman in this board. These characteristics 
are associated to greater decrease in market value, 
corroborating Silveira, Barros and Famá (2003). The 
presence of executives in the board of directors is also 
associated with larger companies.
In 82% of the companies the presence of independent 
directors was verified, which is associated with smaller 
companies and with lower concentration of voting 
rights. Just as in the case of board of directors’ members 
not appointed by the controlling shareholder, the 
absence of independent directors in companies having 
a high concentration of voting rights may aggravate 
agency problems between controlling and minority 
shareholders.
Table 6 displays the Pearson’s correlation matrix 
between the metric variables included in the regression 
analysis. Although some variables do not follow a normal 
distribution, the normality assumption may be relaxed 
as the sample grows (Brooks, 2014). The two variables 
indicating executive board compensation, used in the 
estimations as dependent variables, are the only variables 
with a high correlation, something which could lead to 
collinearity problems.
Table 6 
Correlation matrix between metric variables
∆TCOM ∆PCCOM ∆MV MINBD INTBD INDBD SIZE ROE
∆PCCOM 0.81***
∆MV 0.14** 0.11*
MINBD -0.06 -0.06 0.05
INTBD 0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.01
INDBD -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.01 0.42*** -0.09
SIZE -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.21*** 0.15** -0.31***
ROE 0.06 -0.03 -0.12* -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10*
OWNER -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.52*** 0.09 -0.39*** 0.32*** 0.04
Notes: the variables are described in Table 1; unbalanced panel of 92 companies; number of observations: 272; period under 
analysis: 2013 to 2015; Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the metric variables.
*, **, *** = statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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The proportion of directors not indicated by the 
controlling shareholder is not correlated to the executive 
compensation variation nor to the market value variation. 
The proportion of executives who are also directors shows 
a positive correlation to the total compensation variation. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of independent directors is 
negatively correlated to the variation in total compensation 
and in per capita pay and to the market value variation. 
Corroborating the Mann Whitney U tests displayed in Table 
5, there is a negative correlation between the percentage 
of directors not indicated by controllers and independent 
directors and the concentration of voting rights.
Table 7 shows the result of estimates, having as 
dependent variables the variation in total compensation 
and in per capita pay, respectively, in panels A and B.
The positive correlation between market value 
variation and the executive board compensation variation, 
according to the results of estimates 1 and 7, indicates 
the existence of executive compensation sensitivity 
to performance, both in terms of total compensation 
variation and in terms of per capita pay variation. The 
inclusion of variables indicating the composition of the 
board of directors and the interactive variables increases 
the models’ significance (estimates 2 to 6 and 8 to 12), 
indicating that the composition of the board of directors 
affects the PPS (Hair et al., 2005).
Regarding total compensation (Panel A), the proportion 
of internal directors (estimates 2 and 4) and independent 
directors (estimates 2 and 5) negatively influences the 
PPS. On the other hand, while executive participation 
increases executive compensation (estimates 2 and 4), 
the relation between compensation variation and the 
percentage of independent directors is negative (estimates 
2 and 5). The proportion of directors not indicated by 
the controlling shareholder and the overlap between the 
positions of CEO and chairman, in turn, did not affect the 
PPS and executive compensation variation (estimates 2, 
3, and 6). In addition, the total compensation variation 
was negatively affected by the presence of a compensation 
committee (estimates 1, 3, 5, and 6) and concentration 
of voting rights (estimates 2, 3, and 5) and positively 
related to the ROE (estimates 1, 3, 4, and 6). The year of 
observation only had statistical significance at the level 
of 10% in one estimation (4) and the activity sector in 
estimates 1, 2, 4, and 6. Size did not have a statistically 
significant relation in any estimate.
As for per capita pay (Panel B), the proportion of 
executives on the board of directors and independent 
directors is related to decreased per capita PPS. The 
percentage of independent members on the board of 
directors reduces compensation variation and its sensitivity 
to performance (estimates 8 and 11). The proportion of 
directors not indicated by the controlling shareholder and 
the overlap between the positions of CEO and chairman 
have a statistically significant effect on the PPS and per 
capita pay variation (estimates 8, 9, and 12). Except for 
the activity sector (estimates 8, 10, 11, and 12), the control 
variables did not have statistical significance.
Table 7 
Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity
Explanatory 
variables
Panel A
Dependent variable: ∆TCOM
Panel B
Dependent variable: ∆PCCOM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
∆MV 0.614*** 1.521*** 0.639** 0.948*** 1.083*** 0.698*** 0.082* 0.406*** 0.091 0.159*** 0.293*** 0.104**
MINBD -0.057 -0.273 0.033 -0.034
MINBD*∆MV 0.308 -0.126 0.115 -0.036
INTBD 1.176* 1.505** 0.105 0.203
INTBD*∆MV -4.570** -4.586** -1.143*** -1.079**
INDBD -1.208*** -1.257*** -0.318*** -0.297***
INDBD*∆MV -2.239** -1.765* -0.939*** -0.769***
DUALBDa 0.191 0.362 0.034 0.059
DUALBD*∆MV -1.094 -1.520 -0.341 -0.430*
SIZE 0.027 -0.018 0.021 0.005 -0.003 0.020 -0.001 -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.000
COMPCOM -0.301** -0.163 -0.293** -0.231 -0.236* -0.260* -0.050 -0.026 -0.049 -0.042 -0.034 -0.040
ROE 0.195* 0.174 0.195* 0.224** 0.150 0.201* -0.011 -0.021 -0.011 -0.004 -0.026 -0.010
OWNER -0.421 -0.783** -0.633* -0.502 -0.695** -0.38 -0.039 -0.083 -0.064 -0.05 -0.101 -0.030
SECTOR Yes* Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes** Yes Yes** Yes Yes* Yes* Yes*
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald χ2 32.22* 62.35*** 33.67 43.47** 45.83*** 93.01** 17.84 58.23*** 18.31 26.24 39.46** 25.42
Average FIV 4.71 4.37 4.57 4.53 4.73 4.50 4.71 4.37 4.57 4.54 4.73 4.50
Notes: the variables are described in Table 1; unbalanced panel of 92 companies; number of observations: 272; period under 
analysis: 2013 to 2015; regression analysis with feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) modeling.
a = interactive variables of market value variation with the four variables indicating the composition of the board of directors 
(MINBD*∆MV, INTBD*∆MV, INDBD*∆MV, and DUALBD*∆MV).
*, **, *** = statistical significance of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Other estimates processed, such as t-tests and 
unreported robustness tests, indicate that there is PPS 
by analyzing the relation between ∆MV lagged at one year 
and ∆TCOM and ∆PCCOM. The interaction between 
ΔMV and the variables indicating the composition of 
the board of directors, however, it had a lower statistical 
significance, keeping the same sign of the estimates in 
Table 7. The only interaction variable that had the highest 
statistical significance was DUALBD*∆MV, with a negative 
effect on the PPS, but only when the dependent variable 
was ∆TCOM. Having in mind an opposite-to-expected 
effect of the variable INDBD on the PPS, estimates were 
calculated with ΔTCOM and ΔPCCOM segmented by 
the median and the sign of the INDBD*ΔMV interaction 
variable remained unchanged. Only in one of the estimates 
(with ΔTCOM lower than the median) the interaction 
variable ceased to be significant at the 10% level (p value 
= 0.133), but the sign remained negative.
5. DISCUSSION
The effect of the composition of the board of directors 
on the PPS of those companies whose stocks were included 
in the IBRX 100 portfolio within the period from 2013 
to 2015 was analyzed. We tested the hypotheses that 
the accumulation of the positions of company CEO and 
president of its board of directors and the proportion 
of executive members of the board negatively affect the 
PPS (H1 and H2) and that the proportion of directors 
not appointed by the controlling shareholder and the 
proportion of independent members positively affect 
the PPS (H3 and H4).
The CEO duality is seen as a measure of poor 
performance of the board of directors (Três, Serra & 
Ferreira, 2014). In the sample companies, although 
the CEO duality is not often observed, the devaluation 
of stocks is greater than that of other companies. The 
estimates showed, however, that there is no influence of 
the CEO duality on the PPS. Thus, the study hypothesis 
H1 is not confirmed. Although it is regarded as a practice 
that increases agency disputes between shareholders 
and managers, there is no evidence that the position of 
chairman of the board of directors may be used by the 
CEO to change the executive board compensation.
The greater number of executives in the board of 
directors impairs the monitoring function (Boyd, 1994; 
Lippert & Moore, 1994). Half of the companies have 
at least one executive in their board of directors, and 
although CEOs account for only 8% of the directors, their 
participation in the board of directors reduces the PPS, 
confirming the study hypothesis H2. On the other hand, 
there was a positive influence of executive participation 
in the total executive compensation variation, suggesting 
that executives, when present in the board of directors, use 
their influence to reduce their risk of financial loss (Lippert 
& Porter, 1997), i.e. seek to dissociate their compensation 
from the company market performance.
Another way of analyzing the independence of a 
board of directors, related to agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders, is verifying the 
proportion of its members not indicated by the controlling 
shareholder (Brandão & Crisóstomo, 2015). About 
29% of the directors in the sample companies were not 
appointed by the controlling shareholder and in 33% of 
the companies all the directors were appointed by the 
controlling shareholder. Although in a larger number than 
executives, no influence of the proportion of directors 
indicated by minority shareholders on the PPS was 
identified. This finding does not confirm the hypothesis 
H3, which predicted a positive influence. For managers 
of stock portfolios traded on the BM&FBOVESPA, the 
directors representing minority shareholders do not 
influence the company strategic decisions (Bertucci, 
Bernardes & Brandão, 2006), including the compensation 
policy.
According to IBGC (2015), independent directors 
are unrelated to company executives, employees, or 
shareholders. In the sample, independent directors 
account for 28% of the total and they are present 
in 82% of the companies. The negative correlation 
between the participation of independent directors and 
concentration of voting rights is highlighted, raising the 
possibility of influence of the controlling shareholder 
on the board of directors, something which potentiates 
agency problems between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. The proportion of independent 
directors showed a negative influence on the PPS, not 
confirming the hypothesis H4, which conjectured the 
opposite. The executive compensation variation was also 
negatively affected by the proportion of independent 
directors. One possible explanation for this may lie on 
the trade off between monitoring and pay: as the board of 
directors becomes more independent, monitoring capacity 
increases, and this reduces the need for financial incentives 
to align the interests of managers and shareholders 
(Aguilera, Desender & Castro, 2011), reducing executive 
compensation variation and the PPS.
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6. CONCLUSION
It is concluded that, in the sample companies, executive 
compensation sensitivity to performance is affected by 
the composition of the board of directors, which leads to 
confirmation of the general study hypothesis. Specifically, 
the presence of executives and independent directors is 
correlated to the lower PPS.
The research results have implications for 
understanding agency relations and for corporate 
governance in the Brazilian capital market. First, CEO 
duality is a less and less common practice in Brazilian 
companies, and CEO power, when he holds the position 
of chairman, has little influence on the executive board 
compensation policy. On the other hand, the greater 
participation of executives in the board of directors 
positively raises the annual variation in the total executive 
compensation and makes this compensation rather 
distant from market performance. There is a need to 
verify if such a detachment is only a measurement for 
risk aversion (Krause et al., 2014) or of the reflection of 
the usufruct of private benefits by the executives.
Second, the monitoring functions and executive 
compensation may be substitute corporate governance 
mechanisms (as observed in the case of independent 
members) or even independent ones (as in the case 
of directors not indicated by the controller). The 
effectiveness of governance practices may not be seen 
only cumulatively, as “ the more, the better” type. One 
must take into account the study of the interrelation 
between these practices and the joint effectiveness in 
mitigating agency problems.
This study has limitations, highlighting the non-
probabilistic sample and the reduced analysis period, 
preventing the generalization of results. Further research 
may consider a longer period, with a probabilistic 
sample, and use modeling that addresses all endogeneity 
problems. The interrelation and joint effectiveness of 
executive compensation regarding other governance 
mechanisms, such as the concentration of voting rights 
and independent auditing, especially concerning the 
accounting information disclosed, may be investigated.
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